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In a context of increasing teachers' militancy in Argentina, this article provides the 
first empirical analysis of teachers' trikes in all twenty-four Argentine provinces 
during the 1990s. Using a cross-provincial statistical nalysis, it explains the wide 
variation across provinces and across time of Argentine teachers' trikes. It demon- 
strates that political alignments between provincial governors and teachers' unions 
explain these patterns better than organizational nd institutional variables, which 
strongly shape public-sector labor relations in other countries. We emphasize the 
discretion of provincial governors, for both the application of labor regulations and 
budgetary appropriations in the politicization of labor relations in the education 
sector. Our findings confirm the politicization of provincial public-sector labor ela- 
tions in Argentina, especially after the decentralization f education resulted in the 
provincialization f teachers' protests. 
I n Argentina, a country characterized by ample social protests and a powerful tradition of labor militancy, teachers have been the most militant sector since the 
adoption of structural reforms in 1989. ~ This phenomenon has had wider reach 
because public-sector militancy, and especially teachers' militancy, grew in Latin 
America as a whole during the 1990s, to the point that teachers' protests forced the 
Peruvian government todeclare a state of siege in 2003. The intensity of teachers' 
protests in Argentina is shown by the fact that, on average, 150 days per year were 
lost to strikes in all twenty-four provinces between the return of democracy in 1984 
and 2000. However, the variation--across provinces and across t ime--of  Argen- 
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tine teachers' militancy is wide: while 385 class days were lost in all twenty-four 
provinces in 1989, only forty-six days were lost in 1992. Moreover, whereas each 
province lost on average 106 days of class between 1984 and 2000, the province of 
La Pampa lost only a single day of class during this period while the province of 
Tucum~in lost 343 days. 
The increase in Argentine teachers' militancy is related to their declining work 
conditions as a result of fiscal adjustment, whereas its growth relative to other eco- 
nomic sectors is associated with the diminishing militancy of other sectors of the 
economy (McGuire 1996). Policy reforms, such as decentralization, also increase 
teachers' militancy against reforms that challenge their income security (Murillo 
1999). However, these reasons are insufficient to explain the wide variation across 
provinces and time in Argentine teachers' trike activity, which is the puzzle that 
we address in this article. 
By focusing on the puzzle of what explains the various patterns of Argentine 
teachers' militancy, this article contributes to the literature on public-sector labor 
relations in Latin America and to our understanding about provincial protests in 
Argentina. Because teachers are public service providers, their militancy affects 
the daily lives of families whose children cannot attend school, rather than the 
profit of employers (although these families vote for teachers' employers, i.e., gov- 
ernors). In the United States, the public character of teachers' employment reaf- 
firms the importance oflabor egulations on influencing teachers' behavior (Freeman 
1986). However, we demonstrate h re that in Argentina the patterns of teachers' 
militancy are better explained by political alignments between public employers 
and teachers' unions than by labor institutions. We suggest that executive discre- 
tion in labor relations generates uncertainty about he working of formal institu- 
tions, whereas the strong social inks between Argentine political parties and labor 
unions make political alignments--between governors and provincial teachers' 
unions--influential onexplaining patterns of teachers' trike activity. 
More broadly, teachers' strikes reflect a larger but uneven pattern of 
provincialization fprotests. In the case of teachers, this process resulted from the 
decentralization f education, which was part of the social reform agenda of the 
1990s in Argentina. Due to decentralization f social services, since the 1990s la- 
bor protests have concentrated onprovincial public sectors and included not only 
strikes, but also urban riots and road-blockades. 2 The combination ofdecentraliza- 
tion and public-sector adjustment caused Argentine teachers to suffer from the con- 
trast between their middle-class tatus and the proletarization f their work conditions 
while experiencing the accumulation of salary arrears by provincial employers. 
Indeed, ateachers' trike caused by unpaid salaries tarted the so-called "Santiagazo" 
of 1993, which became the first urban riot of Argentina in the 1990s. 3
This article is organized into four sections. The first section reviews different 
labor theories to explain patterns of variation in Argentine teachers' militancy. The 
second section presents the organization of labor relations in the Argentine duca- 
tion sector. The third section tests our argument using a data set of teachers' trikes 
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in all Argentine provinces between 1996 and 2000. The final section concludes 
with the implications of this study. 
Explaining Public Teachers' Strikes 
To understand teachers' patterns of militancy, it is crucial to focus on the public 
character of their employment. The traditional business cycle theories relate labor 
militancy to the cost of striking and the potential benefits of winning a strike. These 
theories predict more strikes during boom times, and the opposite during periods of 
low economic performance (Aschenfelter and Johnson 1969). In the private sector, 
economic booms increase mployer demand for workers, because the cost to em- 
ployers of losing a production day and employer wage budgets both increase. Thus, 
labor militancy should decrease, other things being equal, as economic growth de- 
clines and unemployment grows. However, we cannot extend this logic to public- 
sector teachers because they enjoy job stability, their jobs are not exposed to trade 
competition, and their wages are not usually vulnerable to economic downturns, 
although their demand is affected by the seasonality of the school year.  4 
According to Garrett and Way (1999), because public-sector employees are not 
exposed to trade competition, they become more militant han private-sector work- 
ers as economic exposure increases. That is, the cost of striking for public employ- 
ees decreases relative to that of private workers with increasing economic 
liberalization, as experienced in Argentina in the 1990s. 5 However, the relative 
increase in public-sector militancy does not explain the variation in patterns of 
teachers' trike activity within the same country, which is the puzzle that inspired 
this paper. Thus, we turn to labor characteristics that can vary across provinces to 
explain variation in teachers' militancy. 
Whereas economic onditions can vary by province, their effect on public-sec- 
tor workers is limited. Labor strength, by contrast, can vary across provinces and 
should affect he probability of strike success and, therefore, patterns of militancy. 
Other things being equal, employers who know about labor strength should pre- 
emptively give in to strong unions to avoid suffering the losses generated by the 
threatened strike. 6That is, labor strength should be negatively associated with mili- 
tancy because strong unions do not need to exercise their muscle to obtain conces- 
sions from employers. Due to the requisite of union registration and automatic 
deduction of union dues from salaries in Argentina, employers' information about 
labor strength--with its negative ffect on militancy---can be assumed for public- 
sector employees. 
Labor strength is affected by organizational variables that facilitate collective 
action, such as unionization rates, union monopolies, and centralized labor organi- 
zation. Whereas unionization i creases the representativeness of labor unions and 
the number of workers they can involve in the strike (Francozi 1995), union mo- 
nopoly reduces coordination problems and facilitates bargaining by reducing inter- 
union competition (Golden 1993). Centralization, on the other hand, is a 
national-level characteristic related to collective bargaining (Cameron 1984; 
Calmfors and Driffil 1998), and thus of little use for explaining variation in teach- 
ers' militancy across provinces. 
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In addition, labor egulations affect union behavior in the public sector by changing 
the costs of a strike or by improving mechanisms for non-conflictive bargaining. In 
discussing public-sector unionism in the United States, Freeman (1986) argues that 
unionization grows where state labor regulations are more favorable, whereas al- 
ternatives to strike, such as arbitration, as well as state-level regulations on strike 
activity affect labor militancy. Because public-sector employment is less exposed 
to business cycles and trade competition, labor institutions should have a stronger 
effect on the behavior of public-sector than private-sector unions. 7
Beyond organizational nd institutional effects, political exchange theories as- 
sume that political alliances between ational-level unions and labor-allied politi- 
cal parties change the strategic behavior of labor unions. Based on their trust of 
labor allies and expectations about long-term benefits, unions increase their short- 
term tolerance for less satisfactory work conditions. Trust is sustained by previous 
experiences and leads to lower militancy when allies are in power and access to the 
state can be used for obtaining concessions. Pizzorno (1978), Korpi (1978), and 
Hibbs (1978) have advanced this argument and demonstrate i sempirical standing 
for Western European countries. In addition to this effect of trust in extending time 
horizons, party links also provide informal channels of communications and gener- 
ate interactions inmultiple arenas, which increases the benefits of keeping credibil- 
ity for labor allies (Murillo 2001). 
Following this literature, we argue that political alignments should have a stron- 
ger effect on public- than on private-sector labor relations because public-sector 
employers are more likely to be concerned about political sustainability han profit 
maximization. Indeed, Hibbs (1976) argues that government intervention i labor 
markets causes the politicization of strikes in Italy. Hence, we should expect he 
public character of the employer to further politicize labor relations (Pencave11997; 
Cox Edwards 1997) and thereby increase the influence of political alignments in
defining attitudes between employers and employees. 
We expect political alignments o explain the patterns of teachers' militancy in 
Argentina because, in addition to their being public employees, a context of execu- 
tive discretion--in the application of labor regulations and the allocation of bud- 
getary expenditures--increases th  value of informal channels of communication, 
trust based on previous experiences, and credibility based on multiple interactions, 
and therefore of partisan links. Moreover, democratic governments in general, and 
Argentine provincial governors in particular, are elected as party candidates, thus 
increasing the use of partisan identities as a tool to generate xpectations about 
their behavior. In Argentina, political parties have a strong tradition of linkages 
with society in general, and with unions in particular (James 1988; Levitsky 2003) 
reinforcing the importance of political alignments based on partisan affiliation. 8 
Although a majority of unions are affiliated with the Peronist party in Argentina, 
education is a sector characterized by its political pluralism, and the leaders of 
provincial teachers' unions have different party identities (V~izquez and Balduzzi 
2000). 9
In sum, organizational, institutional, orpolitical exchange theories could be used 
to explain the puzzle of variation in Argentine teachers' militancy across provinces 
and time. We expect political alignments o provide a better explanation because 
Argentine governors enjoy high discretion in the application of institutions that 
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increases the value of political alignments due to the strong links established be- 
tween political parties and labor unions in Argentina. In the next section, we de- 
scribe the Argentine ducation and labor-relations system to show that the province 
is the appropriate unit of analysis to evaluate our hypotheses, which are tested in 
the following section. 
Argentine Public Education and the Provincial Analysis 
Considering that in Argentina, primary teachers' unions have traditionally been 
organized at the provincial level, and that provincial governors are the employers 
of teachers and the executors of labor regulations, the province is the appropriate 
level of analysis for testing altemative theories about public education labor rela- 
tions. Moreover, this subnational statistical comparison allows us to keep national 
historic and institutional variables constant, hereby facilitating the obtaining of 
findings that support valid causal inferences (Snyder 2001). 
The Argentine primary and secondary education system is decentralized at the 
provincial level. Federal and provincial-level systems co-existed until 1978, when 
the national government began to transfer the administration f federal-level pri- 
mary education to the provinces. In 1992, secondary education followed suit. ~~ The 
1993 Federal Education Law (No. 24,049) gives the provinces a leading role in 
financial and administrative matters, including labor relations and teachers' career 
ladders. Provincial governments determine public education budgets, teacher sala- 
ries, working conditions, and regulations. The federal government sets the national 
curriculum, evaluates the system, implements compensatory programs and, in con- 
junction with the provinces, establishes teacher-education programs. 
In labor relations, provincial governors have the power to decide on the legality 
of strikes, to fix the amount of pay strikers lose, and to call for compulsory arbitra- 
tion to halt conflicts. However, they also enjoy high levels of discretion in their 
application of labor regulations. The application of provincial decree 2202 of 1992, 
which established attendance bonuses in the province of Buenos Aires, illuminates 
this discretion because it was suspended by a governor in 1994 and reactivated by 
another in 2002. In Tierra del Fuego province, the process of union registration, 
which should be linked officially only to the fulfillment of specific requirements, 
provides another example. In 2000, the governor tried to deny registration to the 
largest union and give it to a friendlier one. 
Provincial governors also enjoy discretion over educational expenditures, whereas 
provincial budgets are relatively isolated from the cycles of their own economies. 
Provincial budgets depend on a revenue-sharing system whose formula results from 
the historical bargaining between the provinces and the federal government (Eaton 
2001, Cetr~ngolo, and Jimtnez 1996; Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi 2000). Rev- 
enue sharing pays over 71 percent of provincial expenditures but has little relation 
to locally collected taxes--which in most provinces are less than 25 percent of 
revenue--or population shares, and generates such fiscal imbalances that provin- 
cial fiscal deficits averaged 5.9 percent of their expenditures between 1997 and 
2000 (although there was provincial variation).ll Because the governor has discre- 
tion over 90 percent of provincial resources derived from revenue-sharing, public- 
sector salaries are more affected by fiscal management than by the performance of
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the local economy. Indeed, in many provinces, teachers' alaries also include pro- 
vincial attendance bonuses, which are established by provincial executive decrees, 
and affect strike costs because they are contingent on not missing days of class. ~ 
Traditionally, most primary teacher unions have been organized at the provincial 
level, although amajority of them are members of a national confederation called 
CTERA (Confederation of Education Workers of the Argentine Republic). 13 Fur- 
thermore, as public service providers, teachers suffer principal-agent tensions be- 
tween hurting families whose children miss school, and pressing public employers, 
who are voted into office by these families. Because the government will only in- 
ternalize the costs of strikes if it expects that the alienation of families will have 
negative lectoral consequences, teachers should consider public support in defin- 
ing their militancy. In turn, public support should be related to public perceptions 
about he provincial fiscal management. 
A Cross-Provincial Test on Teachers' Militancy 
In this section, we provide the first (to our knowledge) empirical study of 
subnational variation in Argentine teachers' militancy. We test the alternative theo- 
ries explaining the puzzle of variation in Argentine teachers' militancy across prov- 
inces and across time after the decentralization f education i  1993. We used data 
collected for the first time on the variables of interests, although limitations in the 
availability of information about some explanatory variables reduced the scope of 
our study to the 1996-2000 period. We first explain the variables we used to test he 
alternative theories discussed above and then provide the tests and their interpreta- 
tion. 
Francozi (1989) explains why the quantitative literature focusing on political 
variables as determinants of patterns of strike activity has traditionally used the 
number of strike days rather than the number of strikes or strikers. The duration of 
strikes provides a better measure of conflictive relations in the public sector, in- 
cluding the impact of protests on families. It is also the best measure to assess 
political effects that go beyond the opportunity provided by a favorable context to 
increase wages suggested by business-cycles theories for the private sector. More- 
over, due to its defensive character, the dimension of protests against public-sector 
adjustment should be measured on the impact of the strike beyond its occurrence. 
Therefore, the first measure of our dependent variable--patterns of teacher mili- 
tancy- is  the number of class days lost per year in each province due to primary 
teachers' trikes (duration), because we are interested in the pattems of their mili- 
tancy rather than on the occurrence of strikes; a one-month strike should be harder 
to sustain than a one-day strike. However, we also test our models on the number of 
primary teachers' trikes per year in each province (number). 14
To measure political alignment between provincial governors and provincial 
primary teachers' unions, we have coded all twenty-four provinces on a dummy 
variable that takes on the value of 1 when the governor and the union leader are of 
the same political party, and 0 otherwise. ~5 Appendix 3 summarizes the values as- 
signed. Union leaders varied in party affiliation because of the political pluralism 
of this sector, although amajority of them gathered under the center-left CTERA. 16 
Collective bargaining takes place between the employer (provincial government) 
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and the union leader, making their relationship crucial for the outcome of this pro- 
cess. In particular, the asymmetry of information between leaders and rank and file 
at the time of collective bargaining reduces the immediate role of the latter in this 
process (Golden 1997; Crouch 1982). Although union leaders hould also consider 
the preferences of union members because they are afraid of being replaced by 
discontent rank and file in the next union election (Murillo 2001), we have not been 
able to find adequate measures for those pressures. 
We also include the control variable legislative support, which measures the 
percentage of legislators from the governor's party in the provincial Chamber of 
Representatives and affects the capacity of the governor. If the governor's party 
loses control of this chamber, opposition from the legislature would reduce his/her 
ability to exercise discretion and thereby increase the politicization of labor rela- 
tions. Hence, we expect it to have a positive effect on teachers' militancy. ~7 
To test the direct effect of contextual conditions--since t achers' incomes are 
relatively isolated from provincial economies--we measure the percentage ofchange 
in teachers' real earnings in relation to the prior year. We expect hat negative 
changes in real earnings increase teachers' protests. We also include the provincial 
unemployment ra e and attendance bonuses (as a percentage of teachers' alaries) 
as control variables. Because we are analyzing public-sector workers, we have no 
expectations on the sign of unemployment, but business-cycle theories would pre- 
dict a negative relation with militancy. ~8 We expect hat as the attendance bonuses 
variable as a share of teachers' income increases, teachers trike costs raise, and 
thereby militancy drops. 
We also test the effect of organizational variables affecting labor strength. We 
use unionization to measure the ratio of unionized teachers to the number of teach- 
ers within a province and thereby labor strength, which we expect o be negatively 
related to militancy. ~9 To assess the effect of union monopoly or fragmentation 
over collective action we use the variable union fragmentation, which measures the 
number of teachers' unions per province holding more than 10 percent of total 
union members. 2~ We use 10 percent as a cut-off point under the assumption that 
very small unions are unable to generate coordination problems if a large number 
of workers are members of one large union that bears the costs of collective action. 
Thus, we expect union fragmentation tobe positively related to militancy. 
We test the effect of institutional variables by using legal recognition (LR) as a 
dummy variable, where 1 denotes that the principal provincial teachers' union has 
a legal monopoly of representation a d 0 otherwise, z~Following institutional theo- 
ries, we expect that unions with legal recognition should be more successful at non- 
conflictive bargaining and less likely to incur in militancy. The Table 1 summarizes 
our expectations regarding the effects of each variable on the dependent variables. 
Although we have not found adequate data to measure popular support for pri- 
mary teachers' demands in blaming the governor for fiscal mismanagement, the 
effect of strikes on families cannot be understated. We use as proxies both the num- 
ber of days lost in strikes by other public-sector workers and the provincial fiscal 
deficit as a percentage of revenues in order to capture perceptions about he gover- 
nor, but neither of these is proximate nough and we find no public opinion or 
arrears data. We ran our models with these two proxies and the results were robust 
to their inclusion although we are not presenting them hereY The descriptive sta- 
84 Studies in Comparative International Development / Spring 2004 
TABLE 1 
Expectations Predicted by Labor Theories on Teachers' Militancy. 
Variables Expected Sign Explanation 
Political alignment between the NEGATIVE 
governor and the teachers' union 
Legislative support 
Attendance bonus (as a % of 
teachers' wage) 
Real provincial wage increase 
Provincial unemployment ra e 
Unionization of teachers 
Union fragmentation 
Union legal recognition 
POSITIVE 
NEGATIVE 
NEGATIVE 
UNCLEAR 
NEGATIVE 
POSITIVE 
NEGATIVE 
Political exchange and executive 
discretion politicize militancy. 
Reduces horizontal ccountability 
and increases governor's 
discretion. 
Control variable affecting the cost 
of strike. 
Control variable affecting teachers' 
work conditions 
Business cycle (negative), but 
unclear in public sector. 
Labor strength reduces the need to 
exercise "muscle." 
Coordination problems weaken 
labor and make bargaining more 
difficult. 
Institutions facilitate bargaining. 
tistics of the variables and their provincial means are found in Appendixes 1and 2. 
We also add a vector of time effects and lag the observations on unionization and 
real wage variation by one year to account for the temporal sequence of causality. 
Year dummies are included to account for variations in economic onditions over 
the course of our time period. Whereas 1996 and 1997 were years of relative growth, 
recession characterized the subsequent three years. 
There are three salient aspects of the data we studied. First, the values of our 
dependent variables--both e number of class days lost due to teacher strikes and 
the number of strikes--are nonnegative integers or counts. For some provinces, the 
value of this variable varies from zero to many. The "zero" value is the usual out- 
come because strikes are rare events; almost 55 percent of the observations were 
zero. 23 Second, we have repeated observations (five years) for the same twenty- 
four provinces. That is, our data form a combined time-series cross-section panel. 
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TABLE 2 
Explaining Argentine Teachers' Strikes, 1996-2000 
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Dependent Duration Number of Strikes 
Variable (Negative Binomial) (Poisson) 
Unionization 0.931 0.688 
of Teachers (0.913) (0.733) 
Union 0.169 0.161 
Fragmentation (0.226) (0.176) 
Union Legal -0.383 0.057 
Recognition (0.302) (0.271) 
Political -0.960"** -1.017"** 
Alignment (0.335) (0.278) 
Legislative -0.190 0.397 
Support (1.201) (0.916) 
Attendance -0.089"** -0.075"** 
Bonus (0.024) (0.019) 
Real Wage -0.066** -0.041" 
Change (0.029) (0.022) 
Unemployment 0.120'** 0.081"** 
Rate (0.036) (0.028) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -215.843 -147.245 
Number of observations=120. *Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at 
the .01 level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
For the dependent variable class days lost (duration), the estimated ancillary parameter and its stan- 
dard error are 0.601 and (0.236), respectively. The probability we would observe this data under a 
Poisson model is virtually zero. (Likelihood ratio test of ancillary parameter = 0, chi squared (1) = 
70.59). For the dependent variable number of strikes, the estimated ancillary parameter and its 
standard error are 0.038 and (0.083). We cannot reject he Poisson model. (Likelihood ratio test of 
ancillary parameter = 0, chi squared (1) = 0.26). 
Third, the data, however,  span a short per iod of  time, and the values of  some of  the 
independent var iables in our model  did not change over  that period (i.e. union frag- 
mentation, legal recognition and attendance bonus), or they did so very sporadi-  
cally, such as political alignment, because only six provinces changed their governor  
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in the studied period. Thus, we believe that the fixed effects (within) provinces 
model is not an appropriate t st method to test our hypotheses. 
The preponderance of zeros and the clearly discrete nature of the dependent 
variable suggest hat least squares and the linear model are not the appropriate 
specifications. Therefore we use a Poisson model, 24 as suggested by Cameron and 
Trivedi (1986, 1998). The Poisson model assumes that the conditional mean of the 
outcome is equal to the conditional variance. This assumption holds for the depen- 
dent variable number (of strikes), but we find over-dispersion (i.e. the conditional 
variance xceeds the conditional mean) for duration (number of class days lost). 25 
Therefore, we use a Negative Binomial model for this dependent variable (Table 
2). 26 
Our results show that political alignment has the expected negative ffect on 
militancy--measured both as duration and number--and that this relation is statis- 
tically significant. By contrast, he control variable legislative support, which mea- 
sures executive capacity at the provincial level, does not have a significant effect 
on either dependent variable. 27 
The alternative explanatory variables affecting labor strength are not as good as 
political alignment inexplaining militancy. Unionization, union fragmentation, and 
legal recognition are not statistically significant and in some cases they do not have 
the expected signs. Yet, the control variables, attendance bonus and real wage 
change, have the expected signs and are statistically significant, whereas unem- 
ployment rate is significant with a negative sign that is discussed below. 
To assess the magnitude of the effects produced by our explanatory variables on 
teachers' militancy, we present he discrete change in the expected value of the 
number of class day lost (duration) and the number of strikes (number) for a unit of 
change in the regressors computed with all variables held at their means (because 
neither the Poisson nor the Negative Binomial regression models are linear) in Table 
3a and b. 28 
As shown in Table 3a and b, political alignment has the strongest substantive 
effect on the two dependent variables, and as expected reduces the propensity of 
teachers to strike. When the governor and the teachers' unions are politically aligned, 
the province loses 1.4 fewer days to strikes per year than in provinces without 
political alignment. Real wage improvement and attendance bonuses as a percent- 
age of income also have the expected negative ffects. In terms of magnitude, a ten 
percent increase in real wages during year t is correlated with 1.1 fewer days lost to 
strikes during year t+l whereas for every ten percent increase in attendance bo- 
nuses as a percentage of wages, we expect 1.2 fewer days lost to strikes. 
The effect of provincial unemployment is suggestive because it is significant 
and with a positive sign. Because we are controlling by wage change, this finding 
highlights the difference between public and private-sector militancy. That job sta- 
bility tempers the risks of striking in a deteriorated conomic environment explains 
the positive relation. In fact, higher unemployment reduces teachers' exit alterna- 
tives into the general labor market without affecting the demand for teachers. 29
Hence, it seems as if teachers are more likely to "voice" their concerns with active 
militancy when they are suffering economic hardship and have fewer "exit" alter- 
natives; higher unemployment i  he economy and their own job stability are mutu- 
ally reinforcing in generating incentives for protest. 
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Summary of the Expected and Actual Effects of IVs on Teacher Militancy 
87 
a) Dependent Variable: Class days lost due to strikes. (Results correspond to negative binomial 
regression.) 
Independent Variables Expected Sign Coefficient 
Expected change in the 
number of class days 
lost 
Political alignment between the 
governor and the teachers' union 
Attendance bonus (as a % of 
teachers' wage) 
Real provincial wage increase 
Provincial unemployment rate 
Unionization of teachers 
Union fragmentation 
Union legal recognition 
NEGATIVE -0.960*** 
NEGATIVE -0.089"** 
NEGATIVE -0.066** 
UNCLEAR 0.120"** 
NEGATIVE 0.931 
POSITIVE 0.169 
NEGATIVE -0.383 
-1.42 
-0.12 
-0.11 
0.21 
b) Dependent Variable: Number of strikes. (Results correspond to Poisson regression) 
Independent Variables Expected Sign 
Expected change in the 
Coefficient number of strikes 
Political alignment between the 
governor and the teachers' union 
Attendance bonus (as a % of 
teachers' wage) 
Real provincial wage increase 
Provincial unemployment rate 
Unionization of teachers 
Union fragmentation 
Union legal recognition 
NEGATIVE -1.017"** -1.05 
NEGATIVE -0.075*** -0.07 
NEGATIVE -0.041" 
UNCLEAR 0.081 *** 
NEGATIVE 0.688 
POSITIVE 0.161 
NEGATIVE 0.057 
-0.04 
0.10 
*** Statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence; ** at 95%; * at 90. 
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Table 3b presents the magnitude of the effect produced by the same explanatory 
variables on our alternative dependant variable: the number of strikes (number). 
Political alignment between the governor and the provincial teachers' union has 
the strongest substantive effect of all explanatory variables by reducing the ex- 
pected yearly number of strikes per province by 1. 
These findings upport our argument that, across all Argentine provinces, teacher's 
militancy is negatively related to political alignments between provincial gover- 
nors and teachers' unions, even when controlling for organizational nd institu- 
tional variables that also affect labor militancy. Political alignments, therefore, 
influence teachers' militancy in a public sector with considerable executive discre- 
tion over labor egulations and public budgets. The public-sector character of teach- 
ers' employment also explains that he provincial unemployment ra e has a positive 
effect on teachers' militancy, controlling for wage conditions and attendance bo- 
nuses. 
By contrast, we do not find strong support for theories based on institutional or 
organizational variables affecting labor capacity for collective action. We suspect 
that executive discretion diminishes the effect of institutional nd organizational 
variables by decreasing their value in forming actors' expectations. Furthermore, 
we believe that by contributing tothe politicization of labor relations in the educa- 
tion sector, executive discretion explains the influence of political alignments as 
alternative mechanisms to define xpectations about he use of executive discretion 
regarding the allocation of education resources and application of labor regula- 
tions. 
Conclusion 
This study contributes to the literature on public-sector labor relations by dem- 
onstrating that political alignment provides a better explanation for the puzzle of 
variation in Argentine teachers' militancy than institutional or organizational vari- 
ables. In doing so, it highlights the politicization caused not only by public sector 
employment--protected from trade competition and business cycles--but also by 
executive discretion on labor relations. We suspect that it is executive discretion 
what weakens the effect of institutional and organizational variables, especially 
because the requisite of union registration provides employers with knowledge about 
labor strength and fragmentation. Our study confirms others about he politicization 
of labor relations produced by government intervention i Latin American ational 
polities (Zapata 1986; Collier and Collier 1991; Murillo 2001) and the public sec- 
tor (Valenzuela 2000). It also confirms the findings of other studies of teachers' 
militancy in the region, which have stressed political variables in defining their 
subnational patterns of protests (Cook 1996; Foweraker 1993). The findings of this 
study thus qualify the application of institutionalist theories to contexts where the 
uncertainty generated by different applications of the same rule weakens formal 
institutionalization (O'Donnell 1999). 
By focusing on the subnational level, this study clarifies the effect of explana- 
tory variables, which can be used in comparative analyses of labor politics. Previ- 
ous studies have shown the salience of the national government party identity in 
shaping labor behavior at the national level. In demonstrating that his logic applies 
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to the subnational level, our study highlights which variables affect his relation- 
ship. In particular, we show the value of focusing on who is the locus of labor 
relations and wage bargaining--the employer--as well as the influence of the po- 
litical process and party identities on defining who are the bargaining partners--the 
employer and the union leader. We assume that the discretion of employers in de- 
fining work conditions reinforces the application of this logic. For instance, al- 
though Mexican teachers have been transferred tothe states in the early 1990s, the 
federal government defines their salary appropriations reducing the governors' dis- 
cretion on teachers' alaries. Hence, we do not expect political alignments between 
the state governor and the leadership of the local union section (although there is 
variation in the political affiliations of both parties) to have the same effects as in 
Argentine provinces. Similarly, although education is decentralized, Chilean ma- 
jors have little discretion to define salaries, which are linked to test results and the 
number of students per school. We thus do not expect subnational partisan align- 
ments to be as important as in the Argentine case. Instead, we would expect asimi- 
lar logic to apply in Brazil, where majors---elected on party slates--are incharge of 
labor relations in the education sector and teachers' unions also have identities as- 
sociated with political parties. 3~ 
More broadly, the provincial decentralization f functions and resources had the 
unintended ffect of fostering the concentration f protests at the provincial level in 
Argentina. Political alignments between unions and governors reduced conflictive 
interactions in the public education sector during the studied period. We suggest 
that these findings are explained by the effect of the discretion of provincial gover- 
nors in public-sector labor relations, when controlling for economic incentives (i.e., 
income, bonuses) and labor strength (i.e., unionization, union fragmentation). To 
further our understanding of decentralized public-sector labor relations, we believe 
this first empirical study on Argentine teachers' militancy should be complemented 
by others, to assess in particular the effect of provincial public support on protest, 
which qualitative vidence signals is important (Auyero 2003) although we were 
unable to measure it. Additionally, further studies hould focus on other patterns of 
popular discontent across Argentine provinces to build a more general theory about 
the politics of provincial protests. 
Finally, we found support for the politicization of public-sector labor relations in 
Argentina. Because missed class days have negative policy implications for the 
performance of the Argentine ducation system as a whole, we believe that policy 
reforms hould strengthen labor institutions and constrain the discretion of provin- 
cial governors. 31The effect of governors' budgetary discretion on provincial fiscal 
mismanagement became obvious during the 2001 Argentine crisis, when provin- 
cial currencies, debt defaults, and protests pread across the country. 32 However, 
the cost of provincial executive discretion i  terms of teachers' protests and decline 
in human development cannot be understated in a country where illiteracy has been 
growing in the last decade. 
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APPENDIX  1 
Descript ive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. Obs. 
Days Lost due to Strikes 3,96 9.60 0 74 120 
Number of Strikes 1.13 1.59 0 8 120 
Union Density 0.51 0.16 0.19 0.86 120 
Union Fragmentation 1.29 0.61 1 3 120 
Union Legal Recognition 0.79 0.41 0 1 120 
Political Alignment 0.35 0.46 0 1 120 
Legislative support 0.55 0.11 0.31 0.87 120 
Public Employee Discontent 2.56 8.64 0 81 120 
Fiscal Deficit (% revenues) 7.69 11.04 -31.6 30.8 120 
Attendance Bonus (% of salary) 6.08 7.61 0 26 120 
Real Wage Change (%) 2.56 7.46 -14.62 33.35 120 
Unemployment Rate (%) 12.08 3.94 1.90 21.10 120 
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APPENDIX  2 
Annua l  Prov inc ia l  Means  for the 1996-2000 Per iod 
Province 
Class Public Real 
Days No. Union Union Fiscal Attendance Employee Wage Unem- 
Lost Strikes Density Fragm Deficit Bonus Discontent Change ployment 
Buenos 1.6 1 0.47 
Aires 
Catamarca 11.6 3 0.56 
Chaco 0.6 0.4 0.76 
Chubut 0 0 0.52 
Ciudad 0.6 0.6 0.27 
Bs.As. 
C6rdoba 0,8 0.4 0.48 
Corrientes 14.8 1.2 0.55 
Entre Rios 0,8 0.4 0.63 
Formosa 0.6 0.4 0.50 
Jujuy 14.2 3.6 0.59 
La Pampa 0.2 0.2 0.44 
La Rioja 2.4 1.2 0.56 
Mendoza 0.2 0.2 0.43 
Misiones 0.8 0.6 0.42 
Neuqu6n 14.6 3.2 0.70 
Rio Negro 5.6 3 0.64 
Salta 0.4 0.4 0.75 
San Juan 3.6 1.2 0.50 
San Luis 0.4 0.4 0.23 
Santa 0 0 0.71 
Cruz 
Santa Fe 0.4 0.8 0.54 
Santiago 1.6 0.8 0.34 
Estero 
Tierra del 9.4 1.4 0.31 
Fuego 
Tucumfin 9.8 2.8 0.39 
2 12.9 21 0 5.17 18.0 
2 7.7 0 22 2.01 14.6 
1 13.8 0 2.6 3.53 11.0 
I 15.0 18 0.6 -0.10 12.1 
3 -1.3 4 0 3.36 11.2 
1 0.4 0 3.2 10.26 15.1 
3 4.3 0 16.4 8.86 13.6 
1 5.4 0 0.2 4.97 13.5 
2 13.5 8 0 3.12 8.4 
1 11.7 0 11.4 2.95 16.3 
1 1.6 16 0 2.59 11.2 
1 2.9 5 2 -0.91 9.9 
1 15.8 7 0 2.56 7.7 
1 13.3 7 0.6 4.09 6.3 
1 7.2 0 11.2 -0.23 14.0 
1 15.3 0 1.8 -0.27 10.3 
1 5.6 7 0.6 3.03 16.0 
1 7.9 0 0.4 7.41 11.3 
1 -21.8 5 0.8 2,63 9.6 
1 4.5 26 0,2 1.56 4.5 
1 4.9 16 0 2.65 16.6 
1 -6.1 6 0 2.16 9.7 
1 5.9 0 1.4 -3.84 10.5 
1 6.6 0 5.8 2.99 17.7 
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APPENDIX 3 
Political Alignment between Teachers' Unions and Provincial Governors 
Principal Union(s) 
Governor's Affiliated Not Affiliated Political 
Province Years Party with CTERA with CTERA Weigh Alignment 
Buenos 1996-2000 PJ SUTEBA FEB 50% 0.5 
Aires (1987) (1961) (0 and 1) 
Catamarca 1996-2000 UCR ATECA UGDC 50% 0.5 
(1985) (1994) (0 and 1) 
Chaco 1996-1999 UCR* UTRE (1996) 1 
Chaco 2000 ALIANZA UTRE 1 
Chubut 1996-1999 UCR** ATECH 1 
(1966) 
Chubut 2000 ALIANZA ATECH 1 
Ciudad 1996 UCR UTE 0 
BsAs (1996) 
Ciudad 1997-2000 UCR UTE 1 
BsAs 
Cordoba 1996-1999 
Cordoba 2000 
Corrientes 1996-1998 
Corrientes 1999-2000 
UCR 
PJ 
PAL 
Federal 
Intervention 
Entre Rios 1996-1999 PJ AGMER 
(1993) 
Entre Rios 2000 ALIANZA AGMER 
Formosa 1996-2000 PJ ADF (1994) 
Jujuy 1996-2000 PJ ADEP (1961) 
La Pampa 1996-2000 PJ UDELPA 
(1989) 
La Rioja 1996-2000 PJ AMP (1994) 
UEPC (1964) 0 
UEPC 1 
ACDP (1989) 1 
ACDP 0 
UDAF (1994) 50% (0 and 1) 
1 
05 
0 
0 
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APPENDIX 3 
(Continued) 
Province Years 
Governor's 
Party 
Principal Union(s) 
Affiliated Not Affiliated Political 
with CTERA with CTERA Weigh Alignment 
Mendoza 1996-1999 PJ 
Mendoza 2000 ALIANZA 
Misiones 1996-2000 PJ 
Neuquen 1996-2000 MPN 
Rio Negro 1996-1999 UCR** 
Rio Negro 2000 ALIANZA 
Salta 1996-2000 PJ 
San Juan 1996-1999 PJ 
San Juan 2000 ALIANZA 
San Luis 1996-2000 PJ 
Santa Cruz 1996-2000 PJ 
PJ 
Santa Fe 1996-2000 
Sgo del 1996-2000 PJ 
Estero 
T. del 1996-1999 MPF 
Fuego 
T. del 2000 PJ 
Fuego 
Tucum~a 1996-1999 FREP 
Tucum~n 2000 PJ 
SUTE (1967) 0 
SUTE 1 
UDPM 0 
(1995) 
ATEN 0 
(1991) 
UNTER 0 
(1985) 
UNTER 1 
ADP (1966) 1 
UDAP 0 
(1975) 
UDAP 1 
AMPPYA 1 
(1972) 
ADOSAC 0 
(1993) 
AMSAFE 0 
(1985) 
AESYA 
(1986) 
SUTEF 0 
(1996) 
SUTEF 0 
ATEP (1962) 0 
ATEP 0 
Note: In parentheses are the years when teachers' unions obtained legal recognition. * UCR was 
aligned with FREPASO before 1997. **In Chubut and Rio Negro, the Alianza could not be formed 
until 1999 due to the rivalry between the UCR and FREPASO. 
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1. McGuire (1996:139) shows that teachers accounted for the most workdays lost to strike and the 
highest number of strikers, whereas they compete with public administrators for the highest 
number of strikes during the 1989-1993 period. Extending the data on workdays lost to the year 
2000 confirms the continuation f this tendency. 
2. Farinetti (2002) describes the shift in concentration f labor conflicts from the private to the 
public sector, an increase in the demands for wage arrears and the concentration f protests by 
provincial and municipal unions in the Argentina of the 1990s. Auyero (2003) points to the 
decentralization of education and health as a cause for the provincialization f protests. 
3. The "Santiagazo" involved the burning, looting, and ransacking of government buildings and 
the houses of the governor and local politicians as an expression of popular protests for what was 
then perceived as the imposition of adjustment policies in the midst of corruption and excess by 
political elites. It started with the protests of unpaid teachers and retirees and escalated into an 
urban riot (Auyero 1993: chapter 5). Teachers' protests against wage reductions also caused 
strikes followed by road blockages in Neuqurn, which became infamous when police repression 
resulted in the death of Teresa Rodrfguez (Clarfn, 15 April 1997). 
4. This seasonality isalso visible in strike activity because more class days are lost to strikes at the 
beginning of the academic year, which in Argentina starts in March and ends in December. The 
cumulative data for Argentina between 1996 and 2000 shows that 257 days were lost during the 
first quarter (March-June), whereas 178 were lost during the following five months (July-No- 
vember). 
5. Pencavel (1997) argues that he problem of public-sector unionism isthat here are no substitutes 
for the interrupted services available to the consumers because their service markets tend to be 
monopolistic. In this interpretation the degree of openness of the economy does not matter be- 
cause public-sector workers always lack competition and thus avoid the internalization f the 
costs of striking. In this case, public-sector militancy should be constant over time relative to 
other sectors. 
6. The irony of labor strikes is that strong unions do not need to strike whereas weak unions' strikes 
are ineffective, thereby making the occurrence of strikes hard to explain (Kennan, 1986). Hence, 
the informational theories on striking argue that strikes result from imperfect information be- 
tween unions and their employers and they are strategic only if they serve as a mechanism to
acquire information about he strength of bargaining partners (Hayes, 1984). For Tsebelis and 
Lange (1995), strikes result from employers probing unions whose strength is unknown. 
7. Cook's (1996) study of Mexican teachers' protest shows their resorting to alternative types of 
protest due to their legal limitations on strike activity. Garrett (1998: 148-9) suggests that legal 
restrictions are crucial in shaping the behavior of public sector unions that results in the different 
wage push of Austrian and Scandinavia public sectors. 
8. The two main Argentine political parties are quite old. The UCR (Radical Civic Union) is over 
100 years old and the PJ (Justicialista, or Peronist Party) was established more than half a cen- 
tury ago. Despite high regime instability, political parties retained their links to society through- 
out the second half of the twentieth century. According to Mainwaring and Scully (1995: p.8), 
the mean volatility of lower-chamber seats was 12.7 percent (Pedersen Index) during the first ten 
years of democracy (1983-1993). 
9. There are teachers' union leaders affiliated with the Peronist party, the UCR, and other left-wing 
political parties, whereas provincial governors are either Peronists, Radicals, or belong to con- 
servative provincial parties. 
Murillo and Ronconi 95 
10. Law 24049 of 1991 and decree 964 of 1992, established the transfer of over 4500 schools to the 
provinces, which culminated two years later. 
11. The data from the Ministry of the Economy were provided by CEDI and were originally gath- 
ered for the study performed by Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi (2000). 
12. Attendance bonuses are contingent upon perfect attendance and thereby eliminated by a day of 
class missed by participating ina strike. Of the twenty-four p ovinces, only Buenos Aires, Chubut, 
Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Formosa, La Pampa, La Rioja, Mendoza, Misiones, Salta, San Luis, 
Santa Cruz, Santa Fe, and Santiago del Estero had attendance bonuses during the studied period. 
On average, attendance bonuses represent 6 percent of salary, but in some provinces, uch as 
Santa Cruz, attendance bonuses represent almost one third of teachers' alary. 
13. Secondary teachers made up the core of national teachers' unions until the 1990s when they were 
decentralized to the provincial level. 
14. The sources of information for days lost to strikes and number of strikes were the yearly reports 
of the Consejo Trcnico de Inversiones, titled "Tendencias Econ6micas" (1984-2000). See J. 
McGuire (1996) on a recommendation f r using this source for strike activity in Argentina. Both 
measures ofteachers' militancy are correlated because in those provinces where the probability 
of a strike is higher, the expected uration is also longer. In the period we studied (1996-2000), 
the correlation coefficient between the number of strikes and the average duration of strikes 
within each province is 0.42. 
15. In fifteen out of the twenty-four p ovinces there is only one teachers' union. In six provinces a 
principal union could be identified because it has legal monopoly and gathers more than 90 
percent of total union affiliates. In the remaining three provinces, where no principal union could 
be identified (such as in Buenos Aires, where the two main unions have the same legal status and 
almost equal membership), we have computed political alignment taking the average of the 
individual scores for alignment between the governor and each union. For the governors data, 
see Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2000). 
16. At the national level, CTERA was one of tbe national labor organizations affiliated with the left- 
wing FREPASO. The role of union leaders in the foundation of the FREPASO was clear when 
CTERA's secretary general joined the first legislative delegation elected by this party in 1995. 
CTERA also was a founder of the left-wing CTA (Argentine Workers' Central), its secretary 
general ispart of the CTA national leadership, and in many cases the head of provincial teachers' 
unions is the leader of the provincial CTA section. 
17. Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi (2000) found that divided provincial government has no effect 
on provincial expenditures; therefore the effect on horizontal accountability should not be re- 
duced by budgetary restraints on government expenditures. The data on provincial legislative 
composition are from the Ministry of the Interior. 
18. The Ministry of Education provided the data on teachers' alaries. The INDEC, "Encuesta 
Permanente d Hogares," Ministry of the Economy, provides data on provincial unemployment 
based on urban areas. 
19. The data on union membership are from the Ministry of Labor, Direcci6n Nacional de Asociaciones 
Sindicales (http://www.trabajo.gov.ar). The data were updated and improved for the period be- 
tween 1996 and 2000. Annual data on the number of teachers per province were obtained from 
"Anuarios," Ministry of Education. 
20. Data from the Ministry of Labor, Direcci6n Nacional de Asociaciones Sindicales. 
21. In Argentina, those unions with "personerfa gremial" (i.e., legal monopoly) have several exclu- 
sive fights, such as representing allworkers in collective negotiations, enforcing labor legisla- 
tion and social security regulations, managing the compulsory health insurance plan, and assisting 
the government with improving workplace practices. However, any labor union has the right to 
call for a strike, regardless of whether or not it possesses a legal monopoly. Moreover, collective 
bargaining ineducation does not produce collective agreements with legal effect as in the private 
sector, but only informal contracts between both parties. 
22. •n b•th m•de•s•when i c•uding public sect•r strikes (data fr•m C•nsej• T6cnic• de •nversi•nes) 
as a control variable for popular support, it was statistically significant and had the predicted 
positive sign. By contrast, whenfiscal deficit (data from Ministerio de Econom/a) was included 
as a control variable for popular support, it was not significant. The rest of the variables kept 
their significance and signs in all of the models. We have also included as control variables 
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whether the governor was affiliated with the labor-based Peronist party and whether the union 
leaders were affiliated with a left-wing party. However, these variables were not statistically 
significant, nor did their inclusion change the signs and significance ofthe other variables, o we 
omit them from the results presented here. 
23. For a recent survey of specification and estimation ofmodels for counts, see Cameron and Trivedi 
(1998). 
24. In the Poisson regression model, we assume that he number of class days lost due to strikes has 
a Poisson distribution with a conditional mean that depends on provincial characteristics. The 
lack of serial autocorrelation i alternative OLS models (results not reported) makes us confi- 
dent of the independence of events assumed by both Poisson and Negative Binomial models. 
The authors can provide other specifications for both dependent variables upon request. 
25. The fact that the sample variance of class days lost is 23 times the sample mean is a preliminary 
indication of overdispersion. The extreme significance of the best-fit est of the Poisson model 
indicates that the model is inappropriate (best-fit chi squared (107) = 611; p ' 0.000). The Log 
Likelihood test also rejects the Poisson model (see Table 2). 
26. The use of the Negative Binomial regression model to deal with the over-dispersion problem is 
a common practice in econometrics. See Long (1997); Greene (1999); Hausman, Hall, and 
Griliches (1984); Cameron and Trivedi (1986). 
27. We tested both models for heteroskedasticity and outliers and found neither to be problematic for 
the analysis. Heteroskedasticity does not seem to be a problem because the correlation between 
the dependent variable and teachers per province is almost zero (-0.10 in the case of class days 
lost and -0.07 for number of strikes). Furthermore, we performed the Cook-Weisberg test and 
could not reject the null-hypothesis of constant variance (chi squared (1) = 1.62 for class days 
lost, and chi squared (1) = 0.22 for number of strikes). In order to check for outliers we computed 
the DFBETAs for the Political Alignment variable (Bollen and Jackman 1990) and we did not 
find any observation that shifted the estimate by at least one standard error. Because Belsey, 
Kuh, and Welsch (1980) suggest further examination f observations where the absolute value of 
DFBETA is greater than 2/~fN, we ran all the models excluding the two observations with higher 
DFBETA--the province of Corrientes in 1999 and 2000 when it was under federal intervention 
(DFBETAs 0.22 and 0.29, respectively). However, our results do not change besides amarginal 
improvement i  the fitting of the models. 
28. For the binary variables the effect is obtained by letting the regressor change from 0 to 1. For all 
the other regressors the effect is computed by changing from Kk to Xk + 1. For the number of 
class days lost we used the Negative Binomial estimates and for the number of strikes the Pois- 
son estimates because those are the best specification. 
29. We are studying primary school teachers in a country with compulsory education. According to 
the Argentine Ministry of Social Development, only 1.1 percent of the Argentine children be- 
tween six and thirteen do not attend school (SIEMPRO 1997). At a more general level, Godard 
(1992) suggests that high levels of unemployment make quitting aless viable option for discon- 
tent workers, and finds a positive association between strikes and unemployment i  a cross- 
sectional nalysis of Canadian firms. Whereas he emphasizes the cross-sectional characteristic 
of the data (as opposed to longitudinal) asan explanation for his finding; in this paper we at- 
tribute the positive association between unemployment a d strikes to the job stability that public 
sector teachers enjoy. 
30. We would expect he effect o be stronger in Argentina than in Brazil, however, because Amend- 
ment 14/96 to the Brazilian Constitution imposes the application of 60% of fiscal resources at 
the state and municipal level to education, as well as the establishment of state-level funds with 
a 15 percent of tax returns assigned to pay primary school teachers. 
31. See Murillo, Ronconi, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi (2002). 
32. Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi (2000) provide acareful analysis of the fiscal problems created 
by the political battles over pooled resources inherent in the Argentine revenue-sharing system. 
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